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
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
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The BAROMETER is a student weekly newspaper for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. Items of interest, papers, and articles of interest to the students, staff, and faculty as a whole are solicited.

"We must not confuse improving hygienic factors with creating an environment in which our military personnel can find satisfaction in their work. We must provide opportunities for our service men to find self-actualization through their work that is intrinsically meaningful to them."

EDITORIAL COMMENT: "A place to flop and three squares a day" used to be a powerful incentive for a young man to join the armed forces and the perceived real or imagined perils of the life as a civilian were sufficient to make a "lifer" out of a great many of those who joined. Mr. Henry H. Beam, in this article from the Armed Forces Journal International, explains his reasons for proposing new personnel policies. Mr. Beam is a Navy Reserve Lieutenant Commander and a Ph.D. student in Organizational Development.

FEATURE: NEEDED: NEW PERSONNEL POLICIES FOR THE NEW MILITARY

"The 1970's are developing as the decade of people, just as the 1960's developed as the decade of technology, culminating in 1969 with man first setting foot on the moon. The military man—both officer and enlisted—is being increasingly perceived as a human resource and not merely as an adjunct to a weapon system. Recent findings in the behavioral sciences raise questions about the ability of traditional military personnel policies to provide for future manpower needs in an all-volunteer Force society.

My thesis is that we must restructure personnel policies of the military at the highest governmental levels if we hope to attract and retain the able young men we need for the high quality military we must have in the decades ahead. We have ended the draft, but the Armed Forces are not getting the quantity or quality of new men they desire. The problem does not lie in a lack of effort to recruit. Rather, it lies in the continuation of policies that are no longer relevant.

In the last decade the Armed Services have increasingly recognized that men are individuals with unique feelings and aspirations and expect to be treated as such. For example, in his three years as Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Zumwalt has taken great strides toward improving the hygienic factors in the Navy. But as we know from past research studies, providing a good set of hygienic factors is not the same as providing motivation. Increased pay, improved living conditions ashore and afloat, and reduction of anachronistic military practices have all been highly desirable innovations in recent years, but they are hygienic factors at heart. They remove inequities, but that is not the same thing as providing motivation.

We need to go beyond the level of hygienic factors if we are going to attract and retain the caliber of person we want in the Armed Force in the 1970's. We need new concepts for personnel policies in all branches of the service. But we must not confuse improving hygienic factors with creating an environment in which our military personnel can find satisfaction in their work. We must provide opportunities for our service men to find self-actualization through their work that is intrinsically meaningful to them. Our task is to find the proper balance between serving the needs of the individual members of the military community and meeting the requirements of the military profession. Let us look at some of the specific measures we can take to build a foundation for modern personnel policies which will meet these twin objectives.

DO AWAY WITH THE 20 YEAR CAREER

The first place to start in restructuring military personnel policies is to do away with the concept of the twenty year career. What is so magical or desirable about twenty years? There is no need to set such an exact demarcation to mark the completion of a career and the beginning of retirement. For example, consider why one nuclear trained submarine officer who had spent nine years on active duty left the Navy to work for IBM: 'I had spent nine years at sea and could look forward to more sea duty in the near future. I could also look forward to command of a nuclear submarine. But after my command (at about 16 years of service), where would I go? To a staff someplace, I suppose. To me, there is more to life than spending all that time (20 years) just for one command.'

The Navy, for example, has many highly talented former commanding officers now serving on staffs and other support billets. Most of these men are now Lieutenant Commanders and Commanders who have no chance of getting another command in grade and little chance of getting a command if they are promoted. What do they have to look forward to? More staff duty until they can complete their twenty! These men sit on an artificially constructed plateau. Their careers have resembled climbing a mountain. The primary objective is reached in the middle-gaining the pinnacle-and not at the end, as in most endeavors in life. There are similar examples with pilots in the Air Force and troop commanders in the Army. Why not give these men the option to retire immediately after their command tour and start their second (civilian) career in their late thirties rather than wait until their early forties?

Indeed, why not do away with the concept of the twenty year career altogether? Why not tie the service man's retirement to a percentage of the amount of time he has served after a certain minimum qualifying period? Why not grant him partial vesting in his pension rights after five years of service, for example. There would be many advantages to this:

- 'Men could leave active duty after serving in certain 'pinnacle' jobs, such as commanding officer of a ship, project manager, or senior or Master Chief Petty Officer or Sergeant.

- 'The tendency to overload staffs with senior officers waiting out their time to retirement would be greatly reduced.

- 'A cadre of highly qualified personnel would still exist in the civilian work force which could be called upon in the event of national emergency.

- 'In the enlisted ranks, the tendency to accumulate too many senior ratings and too few intermediate ratings would be reduced.

We are already seeing efforts in this direction, such as Proposed New Military Non-disability Retirement System. This proposal is being distributed to all members of the active duty forces at the present time. This new plan would provide benefits for both voluntary and involuntary separations. For example, a person separated voluntarily with ten or more years of service, but less than twenty, would receive a monthly pension at age sixty equal to two and one half percent of his last year's pay times his years of active service, but less than twenty, would receive a monthly pension at age sixty equal to two and one half percent of his last year's pay times his years of active service. However, at this writing, this is merely a proposal and does not have the force of law, although it is being strongly backed by the Department of Defense. It is a step in the right direction, but it stops well short of the proposals made here.

DO AWAY WITH THE ENLISTMENT CONTRACT

The second major personnel concept that needs revision is the 'enlistment contract' of the enlisted man. Why not let enlisted personnel serve in the same fashion that Regular officers do-under an arrangement whereby they remain on active duty until they request termination. The current enlistment contract is designed to reduce uncertainty about the future availability of military manpower. It assumes that the enlisted man must be legally bound to serve, or else his natural aversion to work will cause him to leave the service as soon as he is faced with a task he doesn't like.

But all the people do not do their best under such circumstances. This is especially true in the highly technical ratings (e.g., electronics technician) which are becoming more prevalent as the sophistication of our weapons systems continues to increase. These are also the areas where we currently have our greatest manpower shortages. The assumptions that man likes to work, that he is creative and capable of self-direction-are much more descriptive of the type of enlisted man we want in the Armed Forces in the 1970's. Doing away with the enlistment contract would make it much more likely that the enlisted man would find the military a favorable environment in which to work.

This also ties in directly with the concept of a career of less than 20 years, and the reality of an all-volunteer Armed Force. Let the man stay in the Navy until he decides he wants to leave. Place the emphasis on offering him an opportunity rather than

offering him a career. This challenges military leadership at all levels to make the military way of life attractive enough to the talented young petty officer or non-com so he will want to stay on active duty rather than return to civilian life and the vagaries of the civilian job market.

CONSIDER THE RESERVES A TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCE

The reserve components of the military should be considered primarily a technological resource and not a potential supplement to the operating forces. The growing similarity of jobs in the military and in civilian life has caused the military man to develop more of the skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders. The narrowing difference in skill between military and civilian society is an outgrowth of the increasing concentration of technical specialists in the Armed Forces. For example, the allowance lists for our new nuclear submarines and guided missile destroyers have fewer than five percent of their enlisted billets allocated to non-rated men. Overall, only one man in five in the military now performs a purely military related skill without a close equivalent in civilian life.

Personnel policies in the Reserve components should reflect this fact. They should be oriented toward providing a pool of highly trained technical and administrative personnel who can be integrated into similar jobs in the active forces both in time of emergency and during periods of active duty for training. We should explicitly recognize that a large portion of Reservists, both officer and enlisted, attend college after their release from active duty. These men constitute a valuable technological resource. It makes sense to encourage these men to develop their technical and administrative skills--perhaps through giving Reserve drill credit for attending selected college courses--rather than insisting they be trained to augment the crew of an operating ship or a field battalion if called back to active duty.

REVISE PERSONNEL POLICIES

The reality of the all-volunteer Armed Force has brought to light the difficulties encountered by following the traditional recruitment and selection policies of the military. We must insure the military has a wide enough pool of applicants so it can concentrate on selecting the right men rather than simply getting enough men.

We need to revise traditional military personnel policies at the highest levels so that we can create the environment in which the men we want manning our ships, planes, and battalions in the 1970's will indeed be the men we get in the military in the 1970's. The recent transition to an all-volunteer Armed Force has generated uncomfortable pressures to meet recruiting quotas without the draft. Yet these pressures are beneficial in that they have forced us to rethink our traditional techniques of selection, enlistment, advancement, and retirement. In the future, we must move towards understanding the military man as a human resource and away from considering him as an adjunct to a piece of machinery. In recent years we have vastly improved the hygienic factors of military life. This is within the power of the military heads of each of the services, and they are to be commended for what they have done. But now it is time for their civilian superiors in the Department of Defense and the members of Congress to modernize the basic structure of the military's personnel policies so they will be suited to the tasks of recruiting and retention that lie ahead. Only with modern personnel policies based on an understanding of the needs of the individual can we expect to have a military that will be properly motivated to do all that we will demand of it in the 1970's."